محكمة قطر الدولية
ومركز تسوية المنازعات
QATAR INTERNATIONAL COURT
AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION CENTRE

In the name of His Highness Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani,

Emir of the State of Qatar

Neutral Citation Number: [2021] QIC (A) 7 (On appeal from [2021] QIC (RT) 1)

IN THE QATAR INTERNATIONAL COURT

APPELLATE DIVISION

21 December 2021

Case No. CTAD0004/2021

BETWEEN:

X

Appellant

v

QATAR FINANCIAL CENTER AUTHORITY

Respondent

Y

Appellant

v

QATAR FINANCIAL CENTER AUTHORITY

Respondent

ORDER AND JUDGMENT

Before:

Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, President

Justice Arthur Hamilton

Justice Rashid Al Anezi

ORDER

1. The application for permission to appeal is granted and the appeal is allowed.

JUDGMENT

Introduction

1. The First Appellant (X) and the Second Appellant (Y) are sisters. They were employed by Encryptics Data Security LLC (Encryptics), a QFC registered company and a subsidiary of Encryptics Holdings Inc., a US company.

2. The Respondent, (the QFCA) carried out an investigation into the way the business of Encryptics was conducted as distinct from an inquiry into compliance with the financial regulations (where the investigation would have been conducted by the QFC Regulatory Authority). The QFCA concluded that there were breaches in relation to the conduct of the affairs of Encryptics and a failure to assist the investigation.

3. On 11 September 2019, the QFCA issued Decision Notices against X as a Director and General Manager of Encryptics alleging contraventions as regards her duties as an officer of Encryptics and in relation to the investigation, against Y as Administration Manager as regards her duties in relation to the investigation and against Encryptics. The Decision Notices imposed fines of $48,000 on X and $9,000 on Y. A penalty of $48,000 was imposed on Encryptics

4. By notices of appeal filed by X on 22 November 2020 and by Y on 14 December 2020 each appealed against the Decision Notices to the Regulatory Tribunal.

5. Provision is made in the QFC Law Schedule 5 paragraph 8 for the time within which appeals must be brought. The text of the provision has been translated officially as:

> Appeals against decisions made by any of the QFC authorities or institutions may be filed before [the Tribunal] within (60) days from the date the decision is published in

the respective gazette if available or when the concerned party is legally notified as per a registered written notice.

6. The QFCA submitted the appeals had been brought out of time; it also contended on the basis of the decision of this court in *Al Tamimi v Employment Standards Office and Qatar Finance and Business Academy* [2018] QIC (A) 3, affirming the decision of the Regulatory Tribunal [2018] QIC (RT) 2, that the Regulatory Tribunal had no power to extend time. The Regulatory Tribunal directed it would determine as a preliminary issue whether the appeals had been brought out of time. No oral hearing was requested by the parties. The Regulatory Tribunal considered the issue on the basis of the documents, statements and submissions on which *pro bono* assistance was provided to the appellants.

7. In a judgment dated 29 April 2021 the Regulatory Tribunal (Sir William Blair Chairman, Justice Sean Hagan and Justice Muna Al Marzouqi) held that the appeals by X and by Y were filed out of time, the Regulatory Tribunal had no discretion to extend the time and therefore it had no jurisdiction to decide the appeals.

The facts relating to the notification of the decision to the appellants

8. The 60-day period in paragraph 8 of Schedule 5 for bringing an appeal runs either from publication in the gazette (if available) or from when the concerned party "is legally notified as per a registered written notice". The period is one that runs in calendar days. There is no basis for contending it runs in working days.

9. As the QFCA does not publish its decisions in a gazette or (what may be a more precise translation of the Arabic) a bulletin or announcement board, the relevant facts are those relating to the notification. Although in 2020 the QFCA issued two public statements in relation to the disciplinary action taken by it, the first referring to Encryptics and both Appellants (without expressly naming either individual) and the second to Encryptics and X (in that instance naming her), it was not suggested to us that either of these statements constituted publication of the decision in a gazette within the meaning of paragraph 8 of Schedule 5.

10. These can be shortly stated on the basis of the findings made by the Regulatory Tribunal for the purposes of the preliminary issues. It is unnecessary to refer to the evidence set out in the judgment of the Regulatory Tribunal for those findings.

(a) In relation to X

i. The formal investigation began in February 2019 and ended on 31 March 2019. X was aware of the investigation.

ii. On 15 June 2019 X's employment with Encryptics terminated as Encryptics closed its business in Qatar. On 5 August 2019 X received from the QFCA a Notice of Proposed Action, a step required before a determination can be made or a penalty imposed by the QFCA. On 11 September 2019 the Decision Notice was issued.

iii. On 12 September 2019 the Decision Notice was emailed to her and received by her. The Regulatory Tribunal found that X could not have been under any misapprehension as to the nature of the document.

iv. On 15 September 2019 the Decision Notices was sent to the registered address of Encryptics. The letter arrived on 16 September, but at that time X was no longer working for Encryptics.

v. An initial error in the Decision Notice as to the time for appeal was promptly corrected.

(b) In relation to Y

i. There was no evidence that Y was aware of the investigation as her employment with Encryptics was terminated on 28 December 2018.

ii. On the day the Decision Notice was emailed to X it was also emailed to Y with a covering email which stated: "Please find attached important legal documents for your attention and compliance".

iii. Shortly thereafter the QFCA received a message to say that the message to Y had been rejected by the email system and asking that the email address be checked. The Regulatory Tribunal held that Y did not receive it.

iv. The QFCA asked the other recipients of the email to forward it to Y; there was no evidence it was forwarded to her.

v. On 15 September 2019, the Decision Notices were sent to the registered address of Encryptics. The letter arrived on 16 September, but at that time Y was no longer working for Encryptics.

(c) As the penalties were not paid, the QFCA brought enforcement proceedings before the Qatar International Court. On the Court's direction, the proceedings were advertised, and an order made permitting the QFCA to serve the claim form in those proceedings on the police. On 24 September 2020 X and Y were notified through the Police Department that a case had been filed by the QFCA against them.

(d) Both accepted before the Tribunal that they became aware of the Decision Notices on 24 September 2020.

(e) In the course of the hearing before us, a little more information was made available as to what had taken place when service of the QIC proceedings were effected though the police. The QFCA then asked the police by letter to notify X and Y of the proceedings; it provided the police with the documents relating to the enforcement proceedings; included within these documents were the Decision Notices. The police signed a delivery receipt for the documents on 6 September 2020. The Police contacted both X and Y by telephone and told them that they had legal documents for them. Both attended at the police station on 24 September 2020 and received the documents.

(f) On the basis that the 60-day period was in each case to be calculated in the ways identified by the Tribunal, that period had expired by the time the Notice of Appeal was filed by X on 22 November 2020 and by Y on 14 December 2020.

The decision of the Regulatory Tribunal

11. Before the Regulatory Tribunal the QFCA contended that it could rely on the provisions of Article 18 of the QFC Civil and Commercial Court Regulations and Procedural Rules (the Court Procedural Rules) which sets out the way in which claim forms can be served. The QFCA said that it was its internal policy to adopt a means of service which would satisfy the requirements for Court proceedings.

12. The Regulatory Tribunal considered that Article 18 of the Court Procedural Rules could be compared with Article 11.3 of the Regulations and Procedural Rules of the QFC Regulatory Tribunal (the RT Procedural Rules) as to service of a Notice of Appeal by an appellant on QFC Institutions. It provides:

> The appellant can serve his appeal notice by any means that ensures that it is brought to the attention of the QFC Institution concerned.

13. There was, in the view of the Regulatory Tribunal, a closer analogy with the rules that applied to the service of notices by the QFC Regulatory Authority which in GENE 5A.2.1 provide:

> (1) Where the Regulatory Authority is required to give a person a written notice, the authority may do so by any means that the Authority reasonably believes will bring the notice to the person's attention.
>
> (2) In particular, and without limiting subrule (1), the authority may give a person a written notice:
>
> (a) personally;
> (b) electronically; or
> (c) by post

14. After considering these provisions, the Regulatory Tribunal held at paragraph 39 that when dealing with individuals, the essential consideration was that a Decision Notice was given in a way which effectively brought it to the attention of the subject. It was essential that

this was done properly because administrative action was being taken against the individual, in this case by the imposition of fines which were ultimately enforceable through the court.

15. Applying its decision on the law to the facts as we have summarised them, the Regulatory Tribunal held that

    (a) X was validly notified of the Decision Notice by the email of 12 September 2019; that was therefore the time at which the 60-day period began to run.

    (b) In respect of Y the Decision Notice was, however, not brought to her attention until 24 September 2020 when both sisters were notified by the Police Department that a case by the QFCA had been filed against them; that was therefore the date of service on her and from which the 60-day period began to run.

16. The Regulatory Tribunal then held that as in each case the appeals against the Decision Notices were brought more than 60 days after the date of service, the Tribunal had no power to extend time following *Al Tamimi v Employment Standards Office and Qatar Finance and Business Academy* [2018] QIC (A) 3.

The scope of the appeal

17. The appellants appealed to this Court with *pro bono* assistance which was provided on this occasion by Ms Catriona Nicol and Mr Joseph Dyke. The Notice of Appeal set out 4 grounds:

    (a) The Regulatory Tribunal erred in holding that it had no power to extend the period of 60 days within which to bring an appeal from the Decision Notice.
    (b) The Decision Notices were initially defective as they specified the wrong period within which appeals should be brought.
    (c) The Decision Notice was not effectively served by email on X.

(d) The QFCA had no jurisdiction to issue the Decision Notice in respect of Y as she was not in the employment of Encryptics at the time she was asked to attend interview; it was this failure which was alleged to be in breach of the QFCA Regulations.

There was, unsurprisingly, no appeal against the findings as to when the Decision Notice was brought to the attention of each appellant.

18. It is first necessary, before considering whether there is any power to extend the 60-day period, to determine whether in fact the 60-day period had expired when the Notices of Appeal were filed. This question required consideration of the meaning of the provision in paragraph 8 which specifies that the period runs from the date "when the concerned party is legally notified as per a registered written notice". We considered that that question gave rise to 3 issues on which we asked for submissions:

(a) the point of time at which the 60-day period began to run;
(b) the manner and form in which the concerned party was to be legally notified under the provisions of paragraph 8 of Schedule 5 to the QFC Law;
(c) the document said to constitute the legal notification to each of the appellants under paragraph 8 of Schedule 5 to the QFC Law.

19. These issues were not raised before the Regulatory Tribunal. None of the parties had sought to advance any argument in relation to the wording we have set out. Nor were any of these issues raised in the Notice of Appeal.

20. We received written submissions on the issues we had identified and an oral hearing on all the issues took place on 21 November 2021. The parties were represented by counsel: Ms Naina Patel, London, for the QFCA and Miss Catriona Nicol, Doha, for the appellants *pro bono*.

When, if at all, were the appellants legally notified as per a registered written notice?

21. There was no dispute before us that the 60-day period ran from the date when the concerned party was legally notified of the Decision Notice by a registered written notice. It was not relevant for the purposes of paragraph 8 of Schedule 5 that the person may have been aware of the decision; the person has to have been legally notified by "a registered written notice" (as translated in the official translation) or more precisely translated in legal terms as "by registered letter with acknowledgement of receipt or delivery confirmation."

22. This formal requirement of "a registered written notice" for notification (which term we use to include the requirements of the more precise translation to which we have referred) was, in our view, imposed so that the concerned party would be in no doubt of the importance of the Decision Notice or other similar decision. Furthermore, as the commencement of the 60-day period for appeal would be recorded by the acknowledgement of receipt or delivery confirmation, there would be no dispute as to when it began to run. This requirement was entirely in accord with procedural requirements common in many states within the Gulf.

23. Before turning to the meaning of the words of the provision as applied to the facts of the case, it is necessary to consider whether any assistance can be derived from the RT Procedural Rules. Paragraph 10.2 of the RT Procedural Rules provides:

> .. an appeal notice must be filed with the Regulatory Tribunal (in accordance with paragraph 8 of Schedule 5 to the QFC Law)
>
> > 10.2.2 within 60 days from the date when the appellant is notified by an official notice in writing.

24. Thus, it might be suggested something less than "a registered written notice was required." However, Article 9(5) of the RT Procedural Rules provides:

> Subject to any contrary provision in the QFC Law or in QFC Regulations, the Chairman has the power (which he may delegate to a Judge or to the Registrar)

to extend or abridge any time limit imposed by these Regulations and Procedure Rules or ordered by the Regulatory Tribunal; but nothing in this article empowers the Regulatory Tribunal to abridge any time limit set out in the QFC Law.

Thus, the requirement in the RT Procedural Rules cannot be read down to abridge the requirement set out in paragraph 8.

25. Thus, the argument before us rightly centred on the meaning of the requirement in paragraph 8 of Schedule 5 to the QFC Law. We would observe that if the time limit under paragraph 8 of Schedule 5 to the QFC Law cannot be extended by the Regulatory Tribunal (as this court decided in *Al Tamimi)*, we consider that the QFCA must prove on the evidence that it notified concerned persons strictly in accordance with the provisions of the paragraph. There were three events that were relied on by the QFCA before us as constituting compliance with the provision.

(a) The email sent to X

The sending of emails was recorded, as is the case in most email systems, in the list of emails sent. That record was also held on a server. It was submitted that recording in that manner satisfied the requirements of paragraph 8 of Schedule 5 to the QFC Law. We cannot accept that argument. The provision refers to " a registered written notice". The recording of an email in the email system cannot on any reading of that term satisfy that requirement. The legislation could, of course, be amended to provide for notification by email in this way, but it has not been. This is in contrast to the provision in GENE 5A.2.1 which has been drafted to permit electronic service of documents to which the provision is applicable. In an unsolicited email sent to the Court on 14 October 2021 the QFCA referred to Qatari Law No. (7) Regarding the Settlement of Administrative Disputes. This reference was not pursued by the QFCA at the hearing and we do not find it helpful in construing the differently worded provisions of paragraph 8 of Schedule 5

(b) *Sending the Decision Notice to Encryptics on 15 September 2019 by registered post and the provision of a receipt for delivery of that item*.

There was evidence that the Decision Notice had been sent to Encryptics by registered post and that the QFCA had received from Qatar Post a receipt for that registered item confirming its delivery. However, it was clear that it was not sent to an address where it would reach the appellants. It was the address of their employers, not their residence. In any event, they were not employed by Encryptics at that time. Although the means employed by the QFCA was in accordance with paragraph 8 of Schedule 5 to the QFC Law, it was not sent to the appropriate address.

(c) The delivery of the Decision Notice at the police station.

It is clear that service through the police is a recognised means of personal service in accordance with the provisions of Article 10.9 of the Qatar Civil and Commercial Procedural Law (law 13 of 1990) where a person cannot be personally served or found. As this method of service of the QIC enforcement proceedings was authorised by the QIC, it was an effective means of service of those proceedings.

However, the question as to whether the appellants were given notice in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 8 of Schedule 5 to the QFC Law depends on compliance with the provisions of that law. On the further evidence provided to us, although the appellants were notified of the Decision Notice by the police handing the Decision Notice to them as part of the bundle of documents served in the QIC enforcement proceedings, there was no evidence before us that anything was done at the police station which amounted to the provision of "a registered written notice", particularly the requirement of a delivery confirmation or an acknowledgement of receipt. Simply handing the documents over without more could not amount to this. The only receipt was the receipt for delivery by the QFCA to the police on 6 September 2020; there was no written confirmation of delivery by the police to the appellants or any written confirmation of receipt. The QFCA have therefore not proved that the appellants were notified strictly in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 8 of Schedule 5 to the QFC Law.

26. Thus, on the facts as applied to the term in paragraph 8 of Schedule 5 of the QFC Law, the QFCA have not satisfied us that the appellants were legally notified "as per a registered written notice". In our view this requirement will ordinarily be satisfied by sending the Decision Notice through registered mail to the address of the residence of the person with a confirmation of delivery or acknowledgement of receipt. The requirements of paragraph 8 provide a clear means of ensuring that the importance of the Decision Notice is understood and provides certainty of the time received. If for any reason the QFCA could not so obtain the necessary address, resort might then be had to publication of the decision in a relevant gazette.

27. We have also considered the provisions of paragraph 9 of Schedule 5 to the QFC Law which provides:

> 9. If a petition is submitted to the concerned body that issued the relevant decision, the time limit mentioned in clause (8) shall be suspended. The QFC relevant entity that issued the decision must respond to the petitioner within (60) days of lodging the petition. If a 60-day period passes without response, the petition shall be deemed as though rejected. The period for the legal claim shall start on the date the explicit or implicit rejection of the challenge is recognised.

28. The ordinary meaning of this paragraph is entirely consistent with the meaning of paragraph 8 of Schedule 5 to the QFC Law.

29. It was submitted to us that if by "a registered written notice" what was required was the sending of the notice by registered post to their place of residence, the consequence would be that persons could evade notification of the Decision Notice by not making their address available. This would be a matter of serious concern, if there was the prospect that this was a realistic problem. We do not think it is as there are two answers. First, this is the only occasion on which a point has arisen in relation to "registered written notice". Second it is now a legal requirement for all in Qatar, in common with most states, to provide an address. This is recorded on a state data base to which access is given to official bodies and courts. It is difficult to see why the QFCA could not obtain the necessary address through the data base.

The power of the Regulatory Tribunal to extend the time limit

30. In the light of our decision that there was no event which amounted to compliance with the notification provisions of paragraph 8 of Schedule 5 to the QFC Law in respect of the Decision Notice, it is unnecessary to decide whether the Regulatory Tribunal had a discretion to extend the time limit. However, in the light of the extensive argument, we will shortly express our provisional views.

The decision in Al Tamimi

31. In *Al Tamimi* the Regulatory Tribunal held the words "may be filed" in paragraph 8 imposed a time limit; that was their natural reading (paragraph 6 of [2018] QIC (RT) 2); the Regulatory Tribunal had no power to extend the time limit of 60 days because the provision in the QFC Law was a contrary provision; in any event there was no power under Article 9 (5) of the RT Procedural Rules to abridge the time limit set out in the QFC law (paragraph 14 of [2018] QIC (RT) 2).

32. Initially on appeal the advocate appointed by the court to put the case of the appellant contended that the words "may be filed" were permissive, but subsequently accepted the contention of the QFCA that the words were better translated as "shall" or "must" be filed within 60 days; there was no power to extend that period as the power to abridge was "subject to any contrary provision of the QFC Law" (paragraphs 99-101). The Appellate Division therefore proceeded on the basis that the translation was not in dispute before them and accordingly held at paragraph 101 that there was no power to extend the time limit.

33. It is the appellants' contention that *Al Tamimi* was wrongly decided and was not in any event binding. The Chairman had power under Article 9.5 of the RT Procedural Rules to extend the time.

34. Had these issues arisen for decision, we had reached the provisional view that the decision in *Al Tamimi* was correct. On the more precise translation of the Arabic text of paragraph 8 of Schedule 5 to the QFC Law, the requirement for bringing an appeal within 60 days is mandatory; it is not permissive. The Appellate Division had proceeded in *Al Tamimi* on the

basis of a correct understanding and translation. It was therefore difficult to argue that the lack of an express prohibition on extending the time period permitted the implication of a power to grant an extension. As the judgment in the Regulatory Tribunal in *Al Tamimi* explained at paragraph 14, the power under Article 9.5 of the RT Procedural Rules does not permit the extension of time imposed by the QFC Law; the ordinary reading of paragraph 8 of Schedule 5 to the QFC Law was a provision to the contrary within Article 9.5 of the RT Procedural Rules. There were also very considerable policy reasons for reading the legislation applicable to regulatory proceedings so that it brought finality to the decision of the QFC institutions by only permitting appeals if brought strictly within the time permitted.

35. In any event a final court of appeal would have to consider very carefully whether the circumstances were such that the court should decline to follow a decision so recently made. It is of very considerable importance for those doing business within the QFC and the Free Zones Authority (to which the jurisdiction of the court has been recently extended) that they can rely on the certainty of the legal regime applied by the QIC in the Court and in the Regulatory Tribunal; parties will have made contracts on that basis and have relied on decisions for the way in which they conduct their affairs, for the reasons the House of Lords gave when sitting in its final appellate capacity in its Practice Statement of 26 July 1966 [1966] 3 All ER 77. This Court would proceed with very considerable caution before it would refuse to follow a previous decision made by it as a court of final appeal; it would need to be satisfied before so doing that there existed substantial reasons of policy relating to a matter such as the development of the law or other reasons apposite to its position as an International Commercial Court.

The position in relation to appeals to the Appellate Division

36. It is also necessary to mention briefly the further argument advanced on behalf of the appellants in support of the argument that *Al Tamimi* was wrongly decided. Schedule 6 to the QFC law provides in paragraph 12 for appeals to this court.

> Appeals against decisions made by The Regulatory Tribunal and the First Instance Circuit of The Civil and Commercial Court may be filed before the Appellate Circuit within sixty days from the date on which such decisions were issued.

37. Section 35.3 of the Court Procedural Rules contains a time limit in the following terms:

> …must be filed with the Registry within 60 days of the date of the judgment, decision, or determination sought to be appealed, as set out in paragraph 12 of Schedule…to the QFC Law.

38. Section 14.6 of the of Court Procedural Rules provides:

> Subject to any contrary provision in the QFC Law or in QFC Regulations, the Registrar or a Judge has the power to extend or abridge any time limit set out in these Regulations and Procedural Rules or ordered by the Court; but nothing in this article empowers the Court to abridge any time limit set out in the QFC law.

39. In *Re Al Mal Bank LLC* [2011] QIC (A) 1, this Court (Lord Woolf, President, and Justices Sir David Keene and Lord Scott) had to consider an application for permission to appeal which was not made within the prescribed time limits of 60 days. The court said at paragraph 12:

> In this case there was an issue as to whether the applications had been made within the prescribed time. It is not necessary for us to consider the arguments as to this, because if these applications had not been made within the statutory time limit of 60 days, we are prepared to extend time so far as necessary.

40. In accordance with this decision, the form used in the QIC for the Notice of Appeal to this Court asks the appellant:

> Will your application seeking permission to appeal be filed within the time limit prescribed by Article 5.3 of the Court's Regulations and Procedural Rules?

And if the answer is no, it provides:

Please explain why your application is late and why it is in the interests of justice for the court to consider the application out of time

41. In *Daman Health Insurance Qatar v Al Bawakir Company Ltd* [2017] QIC F 2, the QIC had to consider Article 19.1 of the Court Procedural Rules which provide that a challenge to the jurisdiction of the court must be made within 14 days of service of the claim form. Consistently with *Re Al Mal Bank*, the court held that the court had always to determine if it had jurisdiction; therefore, failure to comply with the time limit in the Court Procedural Rules did not prevent the court from determining the issue of its jurisdiction.

42. In our judgment, there were good reasons why in *Al Mal Bank* the Court interpreted the provisions relating to time limits for bringing an appeal as permitting the court to extend time, particularly as a matter of policy. The context is very different to a regulatory context, as a court, particularly a final court of appeal, must be able to hear a case if the interests of justice require. Moreover, even if we had thought that *Al Mal Bank* had been wrongly decided, there would be no good reason to depart from the decision which has been applied for a number of years, which has been reflected in the forms used by the court for appeals and it has been the basis on which parties before the court have conducted themselves.

Other issues on the appeal

43. It is not necessary for us to determine the remaining grounds of appeal set out in paragraph 18 above. The issue in ground (2) - the effect of the initial defect in the Decision Notice which was corrected – does not bear on any of the issues we have determined. The issue in ground (4), the entitlement of the QFCA to interview a person after their employment at the QFC terminates, is a matter for determination by the Regulatory Tribunal in any further proceedings; it does not go to jurisdiction.

The future course of the proceedings

44. The appellants contended that in the event that the appeal was allowed, we should remit the present proceedings to the Regulatory Tribunal so that the proceedings could be continued

rather than require the QFCA to notify the appellants of the Decision Notice in accordance with the terms of paragraph 8 to Schedule 5. However, they made their assent to this course subject to the agreement of the QFCA that the appellants have permission to amend their Notices of Appeal. If that agreement was not forthcoming, then the appellants contended that the QFCA should notify the appellants of the Decision Notice under paragraph 8 of Schedule 5; for this purpose, they confirmed or provided their addresses. The QFCA submitted that the better course was to require the Decision Notices to be notified afresh as this would, in the end result, be simpler. The home addresses of each of the appellants are now available to the QFCA.

45. Although continuing the existing proceedings might at first appear the best course, starting again might in the end be more straightforward. However, the issue does not arise, given the position taken by the parties. The QFCA wishes in any event to start again; as the condition which the appellants stipulated has not been met, they also wish to follow that course. As both parties wish to do so and as there has been no notification of the Decision Notice in accordance with paragraph 8 of Schedule 5 to the QFC Law, then the present proceedings are at an end. Any issues in relation to any appeal brought after notification of the Decision Notice will be by a new set of proceedings.

By the Court,

(signed)

Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd

President

A signed copy of this judgment is held with the Registry

Representation:

The Appellants were represented by Ms. Catriona Nicol of McNair Chambers, Doha, Qatar, acting under the QICDRC Pro Bono Service.

The Respondent was represented by Ms. Naina Patel of Blackstone Chambers, London, UK.

DIGITALLY SIGNED
AND VERIFIED
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