



محكمة قطر الدولية  
ومركز تسوية المنازعات  
QATAR INTERNATIONAL COURT  
AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION CENTRE

**In the name of His Highness Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani,  
Emir of the State of Qatar**

**Neutral Citation: [2026] QIC (F) 19**

**IN THE QATAR FINANCIAL CENTRE  
CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL COURT  
FIRST INSTANCE CIRCUIT**

**Date: 31 May 2026**

**CASE NO: CTFIC0035/2026**

**RE PRACTICE DIRECTION NO. 1 OF 2024 (LITIGATION RESTRAINT ORDERS) IN  
THE MATTERS OF AMBERBERG LIMITED AND RUDOLFS VEISS**

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**JUDGMENT**

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**Before:**

**Justice Fritz Brand**

## Order

1. The Litigation Restraint Order issued by this Court on 5 June 2024 ([2024] QIC (F) 24) against the Respondents, is hereby renewed under paragraph 4 of Practice Direction No. 1 of 2024 for a further period of 2 years from the date of this Order.

## Judgment

1. In April 2024, the Respondents were referred by the Registrar to the President of the Court pursuant to paragraph 5 of Practice Direction No. 1 of 2024 – Litigation Restraint Orders (the ‘**Practice Direction**’). I was then nominated by the President to attend to the matter as contemplated in paragraph 6 of the Practice Direction. In the event, a Litigation Restraint Order (‘**LRO**’) was made against the Respondents on 5 June 2024 ([2024] QIC (F) 24; the ‘**2024 Judgment**’).
2. As stated in paragraph 5 of the 2024 Judgment, the effect of the LRO is that absent permission by the President of this Court or a Judge nominated by him, the Respondents were not to:
  - i. file any fresh claims or applications; and
  - ii. file any applications within extant claims,for a period of 2 years from date of the Order.
3. Accordingly, the term of the LRO is to expire on 5 June 2026.
4. Earlier this month, it was brought to the notice of the Court, through the Registrar, that Mr Veiss has become engaged in pre-litigation correspondence which appears to contemplate further litigation against the Qatar General Insurance and Reinsurance Company QSPC. From the tenor of the initial letter by Mr Veiss, it is fair to assume that the litigation is about to commence upon expiry of the LRO. Moreover, it appears from the correspondence that, at least on the face of it, the action threatened by Mr Veiss has little, if any, prospects of success.

5. In consequence, the Registrar wrote to Mr Veiss on 12 May 2026 informing him that on the face of the documentation before the Court, it may be considered reasonable, as contemplated in paragraph 7(ii) of the Practice Direction, to extend the LRO under paragraph 4 of the Practice Direction.
6. Mr Veiss responded on 14 May 2026. The content of the response is convoluted and the annexures voluminous. But in sum, the import seems to be twofold. First, that the focus of the litigation arising from the affairs of Prime Financial Solutions LLC ('PFS'), which led to the LRO, has taken on "*international dimensions*" and has therefore "*moved outside the QFC jurisdiction*," thereby reducing the danger that the Respondents will flood this Court with litigation, as they did in the past.
7. Second, Mr Veiss seems to argue that, since the LRO was made, the Respondents have not engaged in litigation that can be described as "*entirely without merit*" or "*devoid of merit*", which are the criteria constituting justification for an LRO, as formulated in paragraph 5 of the Practice Direction. In support of this contention, Mr Veiss refers to four cases decided during this period in which Mr Veiss regards the Respondents as having achieved substantial success.
8. As to Mr Veiss' first argument, the converse argument seems to be that the fewer the Respondents' potential approaches to this Court are likely to be, the lesser their chances will be of being prejudiced by an extension of the LRO. But that is not really the point. The point is that in the past Mr Veiss has demonstrated the tendency, both in his personal capacity and on behalf of Amberberg Limited, to engage in litigation which often amounted to no more than a Quixotic windmill chase, resulting in a wasteful spending of valuable resources. The present concern is that, without the restraint or filter of an LRO, he will do so again. And the prospect that he may do so on fewer occasions would not detract from the principle.
9. Of the four cases relied upon by Mr Veiss for his second argument, two resulted in judgments by the Court in favour of the Respondents. Both were against PFS, both were unopposed and thus decided on the Claimant's account of the facts. The other two were taxations of costs by the Registrar. Somewhat ironically, Mr Veiss applied for permission to appeal to the Court against one of these assessments – along with challenging six other

costs judgments by the Registrar – all of which applications were refused as being devoid of merit. But be that as it may.

10. What is demonstrated by these cases is that not all the Respondents' claims were without merit and that the LRO is not an absolute bar. Whenever the Respondents' claims were found to have potential merit, they were allowed to proceed. That, incidentally, is also an answer to Mr Veiss' objection that the extension of the LRO will protect those who were guilty of misconduct against the Respondents: if their proposed claims against these alleged perpetrators are found to have merit, they will be allowed to proceed.
11. But Mr Veiss' second argument avoids the other side of the coin which is directly against the Respondents. The reverse side of the picture is that during the term of the LRO, the Respondents brought ten applications to engage in litigation which were refused for being devoid of merit. Included amongst these was a decision by the President, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, in *Amberberg Limited v Prime Financial Solutions LLC* [2024] QIC (F) 56, in which he concluded that:

*I refuse the application. It is an abuse of the process of the Court, and Amberberg has no reasonable grounds for making the application as there are no prospects of it successfully obtaining permission to appeal against the judgment of the First Instance Circuit.*

12. The inevitable conclusion is that, but for the LRO, all these case that were held to be without any merit would have proceeded to Court because Mr Veiss decided to soldier on. And now he has demonstrated that he may well continue to do so when the term of the LRO expires.
13. For these reasons I find that in all the circumstances it is reasonable to extend the term of the LRO for two years from the date of this judgment.
14. In consequence, that is the order I propose to make.

**By the Court,**



[signed]

**Justice Fritz Brand**

A signed copy of this Judgment has been filed with the Registry.

Representation

The Respondents were self-represented.