



محكمة قطر الدولية  
ومركز تسوية المنازعات  
QATAR INTERNATIONAL COURT  
AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION CENTRE

**In the name of His Highness Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani,  
Emir of the State of Qatar**

**Neutral Citation: [2026] QIC (F) 41**

**IN THE QATAR FINANCIAL CENTRE  
CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL COURT  
FIRST INSTANCE CIRCUIT**

**Date: 1 July 2026**

**CASE NO: CTFIC0064/2025**

**J**

**Claimant/Respondent**

**v**

**K**

**Defendant/Applicant**

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**JUDGMENT**

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**Before:**

**Justice Fritz Brand**

**Justice Helen Mountfield KC**

**Justice James Allsop AC**

## **Judgment**

1. On 11 June 2026, the matter was set down for an in-person trial before 3 judges on 19 and 20 August 2026.
2. On 18 June 2026, the Applicant herein, who is the Defendant in the main case, sought a direction that the hearing be relisted for some future date. That application was refused. These are the reasons for the refusal.
3. Pleadings in the matter have been closed. The application also made it clear that the Applicant did not seek an extension of time for disclosure or the filing of witness statements. Hence, the Applicant did not foresee any difficulty in not having enough time to prepare for the hearing. Its first difficulty related to the availability of counsel. Both its counsel, senior and junior, so it said, were unavailable on 19 and 20 August 2026.
4. In this regard, the Applicant makes two points. First, that it is entitled to counsel of its choice. Second, that it was not consulted in the determination of the hearing dates. But the practice of this Court is not to fix hearing dates with reference to the parties. The reason is that this is not a Court of full-time judges; it is not a standing court. Accordingly, it is dependent on the rather busy schedules of judges who are otherwise occupied. To accommodate the schedules of legal representatives on both sides as well, will render the fixing of hearing dates impracticable. So, while not insensitive to the parties' choice of counsel, the availability of judges unfortunately must take preference.
5. The present is very much a case in point. Proceedings were commenced in November 2025. After the pleadings were eventually closed, it was decided, in accordance with the practice of this Court to finalise matters expeditiously, that the hearing should be scheduled as soon as practically possible. Three judges were already involved in the matter. It then turned out that the first practical date when all three judges could make themselves available, after some rescheduling of their own programmes, would be 19 and 20 August 2026.
6. Significantly in the present context, it also turned out that if the matter was not heard in August, the first available date on which all three judges are available is 18 December 2026. This meant that, for all intents and purposes, the matter would practically be heard

in 2027. The conclusion, in short, was that to extend the finalisation of a matter which started in 2025 to 2027 (i.e. specifically not even hearing the trial of a matter commenced in 2025 until 2027) would be unfair to the Claimant and out of line with the practice of this Court.

7. The second ground relied on in the application for relisting is that the application for leave to appeal against the dismissal of the jurisdictional challenge by this Court has been extended by the Appellate Division to 28 September 2026. If the appeal were to succeed, so the Applicant's argument went, the hearing would fall away. It appears, however, that the application for permission to appeal was originally set down for 2 July 2026. It was then adjourned, at the behest of the Applicant, to 28 September 2026. But, in granting the application for an adjournment, the Appellate Division expressly stated that it will not result in the stay of the proceedings before this Court. Seeking an adjournment of the proceedings in this Court on the basis that the application for leave to appeal is to be heard first appears to be in direct conflict with what the Appellate Division has said.
8. In any event, the Applicant's argument loses sight of the prospect that the dismissal of the jurisdictional challenge may be upheld by the Appellate Division, in which event the finalisation of the matter will be extended to 2027. Moreover, the converse of the Applicant's argument is also true. If the claim were to be dismissed on the merits, the application for leave to appeal will fall away, which will save the time of the Appellate Division.
9. The third ground relied upon for the application is that one of the Applicant's expert witnesses will be on vacation on 19 and 20 August 2026. But, without meaning any disrespect, it should be self-evident that this Court cannot arrange its schedule around the vacation time of witnesses. Indeed, one of the judges has altered their own holiday arrangements to accommodate this hearing date. In any event, no reason is given why the witness would not be able to testify remotely.
10. Of added significance, we believe, is the existence of an interim injunction, pending the finalisation of the matter, which has some impact, inter alia, on the functions of the CRO. This recently gave rise to further Court proceedings aimed at clarifying the terms

of the injunction, and it is almost inevitable that the same will happen again if the matter is not finalised soon.

11. Finally, it is of some relevance in the present context that the Applicant has asked for a vacation of hearing dates on several occasions. In almost every instance where a date has been determined for the hearing, the Applicant sought an extension. Although it has repeatedly disavowed any intent to delay the finalisation of the matter, it would of course be the inevitable effect of its repeated requests.

12. These are broadly the reasons why the application for an extension of the hearing date was refused.

**By the Court,**



**[signed]**

**Justice Fritz Brand**

A signed copy of this Judgment has been filed with the Registry.

#### Representation

The Claimant/Respondent was represented by Mr Thomas Williams KC of Kings Chambers (Manchester, United Kingdom), and by Mr Ahmed Durrani, Mr Umang Singh, and Mr Masham Sheraz of Sultan Al-Abdulla & Partners (Doha, Qatar).

The Defendant/Applicant was represented by Sir James Eadie KC and Tom Cleaver of Counsel Blackstone Chambers (London, United Kingdom), instructed by Omani & Partners LLP (Doha, Qatar).